This article originally appeared at The Vineyard of the Saker
Eurasia is on pace to become integrated like never before, with China’s Belt & Road and Russia’s Eurasian Union providing the structural basis for this historical connection between continents. The US understands the threat that this poses to its global hegemony (see Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard), ergo the rolling out of its latest postmodern weapon, the militarization of historical memory. Eurasia is full of a patchwork of conflicting memories, but none are more controversial, polarizing, and convenient for the US’ geostrategic aim of dividing Eurasia than World War II and the Sunni-Shia split. Let’s take a closer look:
Asia
The US is fully supportive of Japan’s remilitarization, especially so because it rattles the nerves of China and evokes memories of a return to Tokyo’s fascist past. China lost tens of millions of its citizens as a result of Japan’s brutal aggression and subsequent occupation, and it plans on commemorating their memory during the upcoming 70th anniversary of Victory Day in Asia. The US finds this absolutely unnecessary, according to Obama’s top Asia advisor, Evan Medeiros, since a transcript provided by the State Department to Reuters quoted him as saying that:
“We want for the region to get past it so the region can realize its full potential as a driver of global growth, for example, so when we think about these history questions and when we think about this ceremony in China, these are the kinds of considerations that we’re looking at.”
Wait a minute…is the US saying that victims of state-sponsored aggression and those which have lost millions of lives as a result should simply “get past it”? Well, yeah, that is what he said, but remember, the US is consistently subjective in applying its own articulated policies, hence why it has a completely opposite approach when it comes to World War II in Eastern Europe. Before addressing that, however, a few more words about the militarization of historical memory in Asia are required.
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