Props to Saudi Arabia. Unlike other producers, including U.S. shale producers, it maintained financial strength and flexibility during the last boom. When it began to shift the paradigm of global supply, the kingdom was explicit about its goal - market share - even if it didn’t always trumpet the proactive steps it was taking towards that goal. The now-evident objective of low prices, having been achieved and sustained, begs the question of why Saudi Arabia defended its market share.
The position of Saudi Arabia among producers in 2014 resembled the position of Germany in the European Union in prior years. Both had maintained financial strength despite the prodigal habits of other members, and both were called upon to make unique sacrifices to rescue their neighbors. Germany had closer ties to its partners and seemed to see the ultimate benefit of helping. Perhaps because it didn’t have such ties, Saudi seems to have weighed the benefits differently. Indeed, Saudi had no moral obligation or economic need to sacrifice itself in order to redirect wealth to other producers.
Their actions suggest that they intended to drive prices toward a basement price—stepping supply up when prices reached the $60s, slowly tuning it down when prices hit the $40s and below, and increasing its capacity for production even as prices fell. The recent address of Saudi Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi in Houston was straightforward and polite, but it might be crudely paraphrased as, ”Get used to the low prices. Adapt or die.”
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